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Mondev International Ltd. v. United States:
A Case Study of the Potential Risks of NAFTA's
Ever-Expanding Arbitration Provisions
I. Introduction
Within the last five years, a growing number of foreign
investors in Canada, the United Mexican States, and the United
States have turned to international arbitration to redress alleged
wrongs committed upon them by these North American powers.!
From small companies to corporate giants, foreign investors have
brought claims on issues ranging from environmental and public
health regulation, to preferential government procurement, and
denial of justice by domestic courts under a previously obscure
provision of the North American Free Trade Agreement
("NAFTA").2 Today, over two billion dollars in claims have
already been filed in over thirty arbitration cases and tens of
millions of dollars have already been awarded.'
There have been only eight final award determinations made
by the arbitration tribunals.4 With each case, the boundaries and
rules of the dispute resolution process become more crystallized
and yet less comprehensible.5 Still in a stage of infancy, the
arbitration process struggles to become more determinate,
accountable, and legitimate, while less intrusive upon national
sovereignty.6 In the recent decision Mondev International Ltd. v.
I For an overview of the international arbitration process and claims, see generally
International Institute for Sustainable Development, Private Rights, Public Problems: A
Guide to NAFTA 's Controversial Chapter on Investor Rights (2001), at
http://www.iisd.org/pdf/tradecitizensguide.pdf (on file with the NORTH CAROLINA
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND COMMERCIAL REGULATION).
2 See id.
3 See id.
4 For a complete listing and copies of all decisions of the NAFTA arbitration
panels, see the private website of Todd Weiler, Assistant Professor at the University of
Windsor Law School, at http://www.naftalaw.org (last visited Jan. 4, 2004).
5 See id.
6 See id.
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United States,7 a controversy between a Canadian investor and the
world's superpower illustrates the struggle for a proper balance
This Note will explore the legal framework created by NAFTA
and its alternative dispute resolution provisions in Part I. 9 Part III
will examine the facts, background, and award of the Arbitration
Tribunal in Mondev International Ltd. v. United States,'" while
Part IV provides an analysis of the award's implications." Finally,
in Part V, this Note will conclude that critics' fears of the Mondev
decision did not materialize; but instead, the decision helped to
clarify relatively minor provisions of NAFTA and to maintain the
correct balance between investor protection and national
sovereignty. 2
II. Legal Framework
A. The North American Free Trade Agreement
On December 17, 1992, Canada, the United Mexican States,
and the United States entered into NAFTA, which took effect on
January 1, 1994." NAFTA, consistent with Article XXIV of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT"),'4 created a
free trade area and represented a significant step toward
eliminating trade barriers among the three parties.'5 The primary
objectives of NAFTA are the promotion of fair competition, the
increase of investment opportunities, and the creation of
7 Mondev Int'l Ltd. v. United States, Final Award (Oct. 11, 2002) at
http://www.state.gov.documents/organizations/14442.pdf [hereinafter Mondev Final
Award] (on file with the NORTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
COMMERCIAL REGULATION).
8 See, e.g., Joel C. Beauvais, Regulatory Expropriations Under NAFTA: Emerging
Principles & Lingering Doubts, 10 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 245, 256 (2002).
9 See infra notes 13 - 38 and accompanying text.
10 See infra notes 39 - 176 and accompanying text.
II See infra notes 177 - 237 and accompanying text.
12 See infra note 238 and accompanying text.
13 North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, Can.-Mex.-U.S., 32
I.L.M. 297 (effective Jan. 1, 1994), available at http://nafta-sec-alena.org/
english/nafta/nafta.htm [hereinafter NAFTA] (on file with the North Carolina Journal of
International Law and Commercial Regulation).
14 Id. art. 101, at 297.
15 Id.
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procedures for resolving disputes among the parties. 6
The very structure of NAFTA reflects the primary objectives
listed in Article 102."7 Part 5 of NAFTA provides the outline for
investment, services, and related matters, which include a
framework for the protection of foreign investments. 18 Among the
principles incorporated in Chapter 11 are national treatment, 19
16 Id. art. 102(1), at 297. Article 102(1) provides in full:
Article 102: Objectives
1. The objectives of this Agreement, as elaborated more specifically
through its principles and rules, including national treatment, most-
favored-nation treatment and transparency, are to:
a) eliminate barriers to trade in, and facilitate the cross-border movement
of, goods and services between the territories of the Parties;
b) promote conditions of fair competition in the free trade area;
c) increase substantially investment opportunities in the territories of the
Parties;
d) provide adequate and effective protection and enforcement of intellectual
property rights in each Party's territory;
e) create effective procedures for the implementation and application of this
Agreement, for its joint administration and for the resolution of disputes;
and
f) establish a framework for further trilateral, regional and multilateral
cooperation to expand and enhance the benefits of this Agreement.
Id.
17 NAFTA is divided into parts, which correspond to the objectives outlined in
Article 102, beginning with Part 2 and concluding with Part 7. Id. pts. 2-7, at 299-386,
613-99.
18 Id. pt. 5, ch. 11, at 639.
19 Article 1102 provides for general equality of treatment for foreign investors,
ensuring that foreigners and foreign investments are treated equally as national
investors in like circumstances. Id. art. 1102, at 639. It provides in pertinent
part:
Article 1102: National Treatment
1. Each Party shall accord to investors of another Party treatment no less
favorable than that it accords, in like circumstances, to its own investors
with respect to the establishment, acquisition, expansion, management,
conduct, operation, and sale or other disposition of investments.
2. Each Party shall accord to investments of investors of another Party
treatment no less favorable than that it accords, in like circumstances, to
investments of its own investors with respect to the establishment,
acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, operation, and sale or other
disposition of investments.
3. The treatment accorded by a Party under paragraphs 1 and 2 means,
with respect to a state or province, treatment no less favorable than the most
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20
nondiscriminatory treatment, and expropriation and
compensation.21 Similarly, Part 7 of NAFTA provides an outline
for administrative and institutional provisions, including a
framework for the institutions, in Chapter 20.22
B. NAFTA Dispute Resolution Generally
There are four dispute resolution provisions in NAFTA, found
in Chapters 11, 14, 19, and 20.23 Chapter 20 provides a general
dispute resolution provision, which is applicable to all sections of
favorable treatment accorded, in like circumstances, by that state or province to
investors, and to investments of investors, of the Party of which it forms a part.
Id.
20 Article 1105 of NAFTA provides in pertinent part:
Article 1105: Minimum Standard of Treatment
1. Each Party shall accord to investments of investors of another Party
treatment in accordance with international law, including fair and equitable
treatment and full protection and security.
1d. art. 1105, at 639.
21 Article 1110 of NAFTA provides in pertinent part:
Article 1110: Expropriation and Compensation
1. No Party may directly or indirectly nationalize or expropriate an
investment of an investor of another Party in its territory or take a measure
tantamount to nationalization or expropriation of such an investment
("expropriation"), except:
(a) for a public purpose;
(b) on a non-discriminatory basis;
(c) in accordance with due process of law and Article 1105(1); and
(d) on payment of compensation in accordance with paragraphs 2 through
6.
2. Compensation shall be equivalent to the fair market value of the
expropriated investment immediately before the expropriation took place
("date of expropriation"), and shall not reflect any change in value occurring
because the intended expropriation had become known earlier. Valuation
criteria shall include going concern value, asset value including declared tax
value of tangible property, and other criteria, as appropriate, to determine
fair market value.
Id. art. 1110, at 641.
22 Id. pt. 7, ch. 20, at 693. Section A provides for NAFTA institutions and Section
B provides guidelines and requirements for dispute resolution. Id. § A, at 693.
23 NAFTA Secretariat, Dispute Settlement - NAFTA, at http://www.nafta-sec-
alena.org/DefaultSite/dispute/index_e.aspx?Article ID=5 (last visited Feb. 23, 2002) (on
file with the NORTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND COMMERCIAL
REGULATION).
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NAFTA except for those with their own dispute resolution
provisions.24  Of particular significance here, disputes relating to
the investment provisions of Section A of Chapter 1 1 may be
referred to dispute settlement as provided for in Section B of
Chapter 11 beginning in Article 1115.25
C. NAFTA Investment Disputes
Section B of Chapter I 1 establishes an instrument for
international arbitration of disputes, which arise from an alleged
breach of the investment provisions of NAFTA contained in
Section A of the same chapter.26 The stated purpose of the
arbitration provisions is to create "a mechanism for the settlement
of investment disputes that assures both equal treatment among
investors of the Parties in accordance with the principle of
international reciprocity and due process before an impartial
tribunal., 27 Therefore, if a party breaches any of the substantive
provisions of Section A of Chapter 11, a foreign investor of
Canada, the United Mexican States, or the United States has the
right to compel the government in which the investment is located
into binding arbitration.28
An investor of a NAFTA state may bring a claim on its own
behalf by submitting a claim for arbitration under Article 1116 or
on behalf of an enterprise under Article 1117 .29 The investor may
submit the claim under one of three sets of rules for resolving
international investment disputes.3" In most cases, the arbitration
24 Id. ch. 20. Chapters 11 (Investment) and 19 (Antidumping) have their own
dispute resolution provisions. Id. at chs. 11, 19. Chapter 14 establishes a mechanism for
the settlement of financial services disputes by providing that Section B of Chapter 20
shall apply, with modification, to the settlement of disputes arising under Chapter 14. Id.
at ch. 14.
25 NAFTA, supra note 13, art. 1115, at 642.
26 Id. ch. 11, at 639. For a comprehensive discussion of investment arbitration,
including the historical context, see generally Guillermo Aguilar Alvarez & William W.
Park, The New Face of Investment Arbitration: NAFTA Chapter 11, 28 YALE J. INT'L L.
365 (2003); Andrew J. Shapren, NAFTA Chapter 11: A Step Forward in International
Trade Law or a Step Backward for Democracy?, 17 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 323
(2003); Charles H. Brower, 11, Structure, Legitimacy, and NAFTA 's Investment Chapter,
36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 37 (2003).
27 Id. arts. 1115-38, at 642.
28 Id. arts. 1115-38, at 642-47.
29 Id. arts. 1116-17, at 642-43.
30 Id. art. 1120(1), at 643. NAFTA allows an arbitration claim to be brought before
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tribunals are comprised of three arbitrators.3 The tribunal must
decide the claim in accordance with governing law, which includes
NAFTA and "applicable rules of international law."32  The
arbitration proceedings are binding upon the parties to the
arbitration and each signatory to NAFTA must ensure that any
awards are enforced within their territories.33
To date there have been thirty-one arbitrations initiated under
Chapter 11 by private investors against the three signatories of
NAFTA 4  Most of the claims have been against Mexico
the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes ("ICSID"), the
Additional Facility Rules of ICSID, or the Arbitration Rules of the UN Commission on
International Trade Law. Id.
31 Id. art. 1123, at 644. One arbitrator is appointed by each of the disputing parties
and the third arbitrator, who becomes the presiding arbitrator, is appointed by agreement
of the disputing parties. Id. If the parties fail to appoint the arbitrators or fail to agree on
a presiding arbitrator within 90 days from submission of the arbitration claim, the
Secretary-General of ICSID may appoint any arbitrators not yet appointed. Id. art. 1124,
at 644. The Secretary-General must choose the arbitrators from a roster of forty-five
persons created by the consensus of the NAFTA parties upon enactment of NAFTA. Id
In the event that no presiding arbitrator is available from that roster, the Secretary-
General will appoint from the ICSID Panel of Arbitrators a presiding arbitrator not a
national of any of the parties. Id.
32 Id. art. 1131, at645.
33 Id. art. 1136(1), (4), at 646.
34 Only one NAFTA Award has been published to date. Todd Weiler, NAFTA
Investment Law in 2001: As the Legal Order Starts to Settle, The Bureaucrats Strike
Back, 36 INT'L LAW. 345, 345 n.1 (2002). All available awards, orders, and pleadings
are available through a private website at http://www.naftalaw.org (last visited Jan. 4,
2004). There are thirty cases listed as having come before arbitration, but four never
proceeded into arbitration, were settled during arbitration, or are State-to-State disputes
under Chapter 20. Id To date, there have been final awards in eight Chapter 11 cases.
Id. Four arbitration claims have been decided in favor of the investor-claimants. See
Marvin Feldman v. Mexico, Final Award (Dec. 16, 2002), at http://www.dfait-
maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/documents/FeldmanAward.pdf (on file with the North Carolina
Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation); S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada,
Damages Award (Oct. 21, 2002), at http://www.appletonlaw.com/cases/
Myers%20-%20Damages%20Award%20-%200ct21-02.pdf (on file with the North
Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation); Pope & Talbot Inc.
v. Canada, Award on Damages (May 31, 2002), at http://www.appletonlaw.com
/cases/Pope_%20Award%2ORe%20 Damages May31-02.pdf (on file with the North
Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation); Metalclad Corp. v.
Mexico, Final Award (Sept. 2, 2000), at http://www.international-economic-
law.org/Metalclad/metalclad.pdf (on file with the North Carolina Journal of International
Law and Commercial Regulation). Four arbitration tribunals have dismissed the
investors' claims or ruled against them. See ADF Group, Inc. v. United States, Final
Award (Jan. 9, 2003), at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/16586.pdf (on file
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(fourteen), with eight claims against Canada and nine against the
United States.35 The arbitrations can generally be divided into two
categories - those based on environmental management or public
health and those that are not.36 The total awards in these cases
approach approximately $25 million.37  The remaining cases are
still pending before arbitration tribunals and represent over $2
billion in claims.38
Il. Mondev International Ltd. v. United States of America
A. Underlying Facts
In the 1970s, the City of Boston attempted to revitalize a
decrepit downtown shopping area known as the "Combat Zone. 39
Boston, acting through the City's planning and economic
development agency (Boston Redevelopment Authority ("BRA")),
solicited proposals for development of the area." Mondev
International Ltd. ("Mondev"), a Canadian development company,
entered into a joint venture with Sefrius Corporation, forming
with the North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation);
Mondev Intl Ltd. v. United States, Final Award (Oct. 11, 2002), at
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/I4442.pdf (on file with the North Carolina
Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation); Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. Mexico,
Final Award (June 2, 2000), at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/
cases/wasteaward.pdf (on file with the North Carolina Journal of International Law and
Commercial Regulation); Robert Azinian, v. Mexico, Final Award (Nov. 1, 1999), at
http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/robertaward.pdf [hereinafter Azinian Final
Award] (on file with the North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial
Regulation). For an overview of many of the awards and their implications, see sources
cited supra note 26.
35 See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
36 International Institute for Sustainable Development, supra note 1, app. 1I, at
http://www.iisd.org/pdf/trade-citizensguide.pdf (on file with the NORTH CAROLINA
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND COMMERCIAL REGULATION).
37 See id.
38 See id. at 69-110. The most high-profile, ongoing case is a $1 billion claim filed
against the United States Government as a result of a ban imposed on the fuel additive
MTBE by the Governor of California. See Methanex Corp. v. United States, Second
Amended Statement of Claim (Nov. 5, 2002), at http://www.state.gov/documents/
organization/15035.pdf [hereinafter Methanex Second Amended Statement of Claim] (on
file with the North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation).
39 Lafayette Place Assocs. v. Boston Redevelopment Auth., 694 N.E.2d 820, 822
(Mass. 1998).
40 Id.
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Lafayette Place Associates ("LPA") in 1978 for the purpose of
submitting a revitalization plan.4 The City of Boston, BRA, and
LPA entered into a Tripartite Agreement on December 22, 1978,
providing for a two-phase development.42
The first phase, which was eventually completed and is not at
issue in the suit, involved the construction of a shopping mall and
hotel.43 The second phase included the construction of one or
more office buildings, additional retail space, and a department
store.44 The second phase was to be completed on four parcels of
land called the Hayward Parcel, which at the time contained a city
parking structure.45  This phase was contingent upon the city's
decision to remove the existing parking structure. If removed, the
city would receive rights to build a parking structure beneath the
Phase II development. 46 The Agreement provided that the selling
price of the Hayward Parcel was to be one-half of the appraised
fair market value as of 1978 plus one-half of any appreciation
attributable to the construction of Phase I on the adjacent land.47
The fair market value of the land was to be determined by a panel
of appraisers, and the appreciation, if any, was to be determined by
independent appraisers.48
On December 16, 1983, Boston gave notice to LPA that it
intended to remove the parking garage from the Hayward Parcel
and build a parking garage below the Phase II construction,
pursuant to the Agreement and an Amendment enacted in
February 1982.49 On July 2, 1986, LPA exercised the option to
purchase the Hayward Parcel." On October 27, 1987, the parties
41 Id. LPA proposed a plan to build a department store, retail mall, and hotel in the
area and the plan was subsequently selected by BRA. Id.
42 Id. at 822.
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 Id.
46 Id. The Phase II deal was structured as a contingent option to LPA to purchase
the Hayward Parcel upon notice of the city that it planned to remove the parking garage.
Id.
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Id. at 823. The notice provided for contingencies to closing the sale of the
Hayward Parcel, including a provision requiring that that the parties agree, via
appraisals, on the amount of appreciation. Id.
50 Id.
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agreed to extend the date by which closing may take place to
January 1, 1989."' The January 1, 1989 date was incorporated into
another supplemental agreement as the "drop dead date" by which
LPA had to close on the property. 2
In November 1987, LPA negotiated a sale of its development
rights in the Hayward Parcel to another developer (Campeau
Massachusetts, Inc. ("Campeau")), but the sale was later discarded
in favor of a lease agreement. 3 Thereafter, Campeau began
negotiating with BRA for the purchase of the Hayward Parcel and
submitted a revised Phase II development project. 4 However, it
was soon apparent that Campeau could not close on the property
by the drop dead date because its revised development plan had to
be reviewed and approved by BRA.55 Campeau attempted to
secure another extension on the option period, but BRA refused to
extend the January 1, 1989 deadline. 6
LPA's option expired on January 1, 1989, leaving Campeau to
negotiate a new price with BRA for the purchase of the Hayward
Parcel. 7 BRA finally approved Campeau's revised development
plan for the property in June 1989, but one year later Campeau
defaulted on its payments to LPA under the lease agreement.58
LPA subsequently terminated its lease with Campeau and the
project collapsed. 9 LPA's lender foreclosed upon LPA's and
Campeau's interest in the Phase I project in February 1991.6o By
February 1, 1991, LPA had interest in neither the Phase I nor
Phase II projects.6' LPA turned to the courts and filed suit against
Boston and BRA on March 16, 1992, in Massachusetts Superior
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 Id. at 824. The lease agreement was signed between LPA and Campeau in
March 1988 and provided that Campeau would assumed LPA's debts under Phase I and
pay LPA $21.5 million in return for LPA's development rights in Phase I1. Id.
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 Id. Campeau subsequently demanded an immediate closing on the property on
December 19, 1988, but BRA responded that the development review process was not
complete and closing could not take place by January 1, 1989. Id.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 Id.
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
Court.
6 2
B. Lafayette Place Associates v. Boston Redevelopment
Authority
LPA brought a contract action alleging bad faith against both
the city and BRA for failing to work out the necessary details to
transfer the Hayward Parcel before the expiration of the option to
buy.6' LPA alleged that Boston and BRA obstructed the Hayward
Parcel sale because Mayor Raymond Flynn believed that the
purchase price was grossly unfair to Boston.64 LPA asserted
alternative remedies, including specific performance or damages
for breach of contract.65 LPA also brought claims for breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, intentional
interference with contractual relations, and unfair or deceptive
trade practices.66
A jury returned a verdict against Boston and BRA on October
21, 1994.67 The jury awarded LPA $9.6 million against Boston for
breach of contract and $6.4 million against BRA for intentional
interference with contractual relations. 68  The trial judge ruled,
however, that the $6.4 million verdict against BRA was included
within the $9.6 million award against the city, thus reducing
LPA's recovery substantially.69 On August 17, 1995, the judge
granted BRA's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict,
finding that BRA was a public employer and therefore immune
from suit for intentional torts under the Massachusetts Tort Claims
Act ("MTCA").7" LPA appealed directly to the Massachusetts
62 Id.
63 Id. at 824-25.
64 Id. at 824. LPA offered evidence of the obstruction, including failing to
complete the appraisals, initiating zoning changes that negatively impacted the project,
indecision as to street closures necessary to begin construction, and threatening to put a
new street through the middle of the parcel on which Phase II was to be completed. Id.
65 Id. at 825.
66 Id. The cause of action for unfair or deceptive trade practices is provided in
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93A, § 11 (2003).
67 Lafayette Place Assocs., 694 N.E.2d at 825.
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Id. The Massachusetts Tort Claims Act is codified in MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 258,
§§ 1-13 (2003).
[Vol. 29
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Supreme Judicial Court.7"
Both the City of Boston and LPA appealed for error before the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court ("SJC"). 2 The city
appealed the jury's $9.6 million verdict on two grounds: 73 that the
Tripartite Agreement was too indefinite to be considered a binding
contract, 74 and that the city was not in breach even if the court
deemed the Tripartite Agreement a contract.75
The SJC disagreed with the city's first argument, finding that a
binding contract was formed between the two parties,
notwithstanding the undefined purchase price and the contingency
of the parking garage.76 The court found that the Tripartite
Agreement was a bilateral contract whereby each party must be
"ready, able, and willing to perform and [must have] manifested
this by some offer of performance., 77 Because neither LPA nor
Campeau initiated the price appraisal process or activated the
arbitration process to resolve their remaining differences with
BRA, neither party could be "ready, able, and willing" to close at
the designated time.78 LPA argued on appeal that it should be
excused from performance because the city's tactics and delays
demonstrated that the city would not perform under the contract,
but the court found the argument unconvincing. 79 The court
concluded that since neither party tendered performance, neither
was in breach or default.8"
LPA appealed the trial court's decision on two grounds.8" The
first ground was that the trial judge improperly granted BRA's
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, holding BRA a
public employer, and therefore immune from intentional torts.82
The second ground was that the motion judge erred in entering
71 Lafayette Place Assocs., 694 N.E.2d at 825.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 Id. at 825-27.
77 Id. at 827 (quoting Leigh v. Rule, 121 N.E.2d 854, 857 (Mass. 1954)).
78 Id. at 828.
79 Id. at 829-31.
80 Id. at 831.
81 Id. at 831, 835.
82 id. at 831.
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summary judgment against LPA on its claim for unfair or
deceptive trade practices.83
As to LPA's first assignment of error, the SJC upheld the trial
court's ruling that BRA was a governmental entity performing a
public function and therefore met the definition of a "public
employer" within the MTCA.84 As such, the BRA was not
excluded from the protection of immunity found within the
MTCA. 85 The Court additionally held that the trial judge properly
applied the MTCA's provision, which did not eliminate immunity
for certain intentional torts, including intentional interference with
contractual relations.86 As to LPA's second assignment, the SJC
83 Id. at 836.
84 Id. at 831-32. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 258 § 1 (2003) defines a "public employer"
as:
The commonwealth and any county, city, town, educational collaborative, or
district, including any public health district or joint district or regional health
district or regional health board established pursuant to the provisions of section
twenty-seven A or twenty-seven B of chapter one hundred and eleven, and any
department, office, commission, committee, council, board, division, bureau,
institution, agency or authority thereof.., which exercises direction and control
over the public employee, but not a private contractor with any such public
employer, the Massachusetts Bay Transit Authority, the Massachusetts Port
Authority, the Massachusetts Turnpike Authority, or any other independent
body politic and corporate. With respect to public employees of a school
committee of a city or town, the public employer for the purposes of this chapter
shall be deemed to be said respective city or town.
Id.
85 Lafayette Place Assocs., 694 N.E.2d at 835. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 258, § 10(b)
(2003) provides that:
[t]he provisions of sections one to eight [exclusion from immunity], inclusive,
shall not apply to: . . . (b) any claim based upon the exercise or performance or
the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of
a public employer or public employee, acting within the scope of his office or
employment, whether or not the discretion involved is abused.
Id.
86 Lafayette Place Assocs., 694 N.E.2d at 835. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 258, § 10(c)
(2003) further provides that:
[t]he provisions of sections one to eight [exclusion from immunity], inclusive,
shall not apply to: . . . (c) any claim arising out of an intentional tort, including
assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, intentional mental distress,
malicious prosecution, malicious abuse of process, libel, slander,
misrepresentation, deceit, invasion of privacy, interference with advantageous
relations or interference with contractual relations.
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held that the cause of action for unfair or deceptive trade practices
does not apply to parties like BRA that are motivated by
legislative mandate, and not business or personal reasons.87
After entertaining both parties' appeals, the SJC reversed the
judgment of the trial court as to those claims against the city, and
affirmed the judgment of the trial court as to those claims against
BRA, effectively reducing LPA's verdict to zero.8 The LPA
petitioned for rehearing before the SJC on all claims89 and sought
certiorari to the United States Supreme Court with respect to the
contract claim against the city.9" Each of LPA's petitions was
denied.9' LPA came away from the Hayward Parcel project empty
handed, but not without a remedy.
C. Mondev's Arbitration
1. Mondev's Claims
On September 1, 1999, Mondev brought a claim on its behalf
before the International Centre for Settlement of Investment
Disputes pursuant to Article 1116 of NAFTA.92 Mondev claimed
that due to the SJC's decision and the actions of the City of Boston
and BRA, the United States breached its obligations under
NAFTA to investors.93  In particular, Mondev claimed that the
United States violated the national treatment,94 minimum standard
of treatment,95 and expropriation and compensation96 provisions.
87 Lafayette Place Assocs., 694 N.E.2d at 836.
88 Id. at 836-37.
89 See Mondev Int'l Ltd. v. United States, Notice of Arbitration (Sept. 1, 1999),
paras. 114-17, at http://www.intemational-economic-law.org/Mondev/mondev.pdf
[hereinafter Modev Notice of Arbitration] (on file with the NORTH CAROLINA JOURNAL
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND COMMERCIAL REGULATION).
90 LaFayette Place Assocs. v. City of Boston, 525 U.S. 1177 (1999).
91 Id. (denying writ of certiori on Mar. 1, 1999).
92 See Mondev Notice of Arbitration, supra note 89, paras. 114-17, at
http://www.intemational-economic-law.org/Mondev/mondev.pdf (on file with the
NORTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND COMMERCIAL REGULATION).
93 Mondev Final Award, supra note 7, para. 2.
94 NAFTA, supra note 13, art. 1102, at 639, available at http://www.nafta-sec-
alena.org/english/nafta/nafta.htm (on file with the NORTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND COMMERCIAL REGULATION).
95 Id. art. 1105, at 639.
96 Id. art. lll0, at 641.
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Mondev sought compensation from the United States in excess of
$50 million, plus interests and costs.97 The United States defended
the claim' against Mondev before the Arbitral Tribunal
("Tribunal"), but only after arguing preliminary matters as to the
competence of the Tribunal itself.9"
2. Preliminary Issues
The United States made a series of procedural objections
centered on the competence of the Tribunal to hear Mondev's
arbitration claim.9 9 The United States sought to disqualify the
proceedings in several ways, which included: (1) depriving the
Tribunal of jurisdiction; (2) attacking the standing of Mondev; (3)
rendering Mondev's claims as time barred; and (4) assailing the
validity of Mondev's ownership of the claims.' 0 The Tribunal
deferred its judgment on the preliminary issues raised by the
United States in favor of ruling on them while hearing the merits
of the case. l0 '
a. Jurisdictional Objection
The first objection of the United States was that Mondev's
claims arose and were perfected prior to the enforcement date of
NAFTA on January 1, 1994.112 The United States therefore urged
that Mondev had no claim under NAFTA. °3 Mondev countered
by arguing that the breaches of NAFTA were not perfected until
the Massachusetts judicial system had dealt with LPA's claims.1"
In particular, Mondev argued that the pre- 1994 conduct of the City
of Boston and BRA was wrongful and that the United States failed
to remedy the wrongful acts after 1994 through the judicial
system, as it was obligated to do under NAFTA.' °5
The Tribunal held that while NAFTA was not retroactive in
force, in certain circumstances, conduct that began before the date
97 Modev Final Award, supra note 7, para. 2.
98 Id. para. 45.
99 Id.
100 Id.
101 Id. para. 46.
102 Id. para. 47.
103 Id.
104 Id. para. 48.
105 Id.
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of enforcement could continue in effect after the enforcement date,
thereby bringing that conduct within NAFTA's provisions. 10 6 The
Tribunal, however, distinguished between a continuing act and an
act that has been already completed, but which has continued
damaging effects.0 7 In its analysis, the Tribunal reviewed each of
Mondev's claims individually to determine whether the actions of
the United States were ongoing as of NAFTA's enforcement
date.10 8 The Tribunal determined that Mondev's expropriation
claims under Article 1110109 and impartial national treatment under
Article 1102110 were not continuous acts at the time NAFTA came
into force. Only Mondev's Article 1105 claim was found to be
ongoing as of January 1, 1994.111
The Tribunal reviewed Mondev's claim under Article 1105,112
which provides a minimum standard of treatment for investors.
13
The Tribunal determined that Mondev's claims under this article
106 Id. para. 57.
107 See id. para. 58.
108 See id. paras. 57-59.
109 The Tribunal began with Mondev's expropriation claim under Article 1110. See
id. para. 59. The Tribunal determined that if expropriation of Mondev's option in the
Hayward Parcel had occurred, it occurred on the date the option lapsed on January 1,
1989. See id. para. 60. Since Mondev did not raise any appropriations claims in the
Massachusetts courts, only breach of contract claims, the actions of the courts could not
be in furtherance of the appropriation. See id. Alternatively, the Tribunal looked at
expropriation of the Hayward project as a whole. See id. para. 61. Upon similar
rationale to the expropriation of Mondev's option, the Tribunal determined that any
expropriation of the project was complete by the date of foreclosure in 1991. See id
The Tribunal therefore concluded that Mondev had no claim under Article 1110 because
the cause of action arose prior to the enforcement date of NAFTA. See id.
110 The Tribunal next reviewed Mondev's claims under Article 1102 for impartial
national treatment. See id para. 64. For these claims, Mondev had alleged that the City
of Boston and the BRA made certain remarks, which indicated an anti-Canadian
animosity. See id. The Tribunal found no basis in Mondev's allegations of
discrimination. See id. More importantly, however, the Tribunal determined that any
discriminatory actions by the City or BRA were taken well before NAFTA entered into
force. See id Since Mondev made no allegations of discrimination or bias in their legal
claims before the Massachusetts courts, there could be no ongoing discrimination after
enforcement date. See id. Therefore, Mondev had no valid claims under Article 1102.
See id.
I See id. para. 66.
112 See id. para. 65.
113 See id.
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covered conduct both before and after NAFTA's effective date. 114
Although the underlying actions of the city and BRA occurred
prior to the enforcement date, the Tribunal recognized that as of
January 1, 1994, Mondev had a claim for which the United States
failed to provide a remedy." 5 Therefore a breach of the minimum
standard requirement contained in Article 1105 did not occur until
after the enforcement date."6 Consequently, the Tribunal
concluded that Mondev's Article 1105 claim survived procedural
attacks for review on its merits.'17
b. Standing Objection
The second objection made by the United States was that
Mondev lacked standing to bring the NAFTA claim because
Mondev had mistakenly brought the claim on its own behalf, not
that of LPA."8 Further the United States asserted that Mondev had
not brought the claim on behalf of LPA because it had not
provided the Tribunal with the necessary information to bring a
claim on behalf of an enterprise." 9 Mondev responded that it was
an investor under the definition provided in NAFTA Article 1139
because it had made an investment, which it controlled
indirectly.' Alternatively, Mondev asserted that the Tribunal
114 See id.
115 Seeid.
116 See id. paras. 68-70.
117 Seeid. para. 75.
118 See id. para. 49.
119 See id. paras. 49-50. Mondev brought a claim under Chapter 11, Article 1116 of
NAFTA, which provides for a claim by an investor on its own behalf. See NAFTA,
supra note 13, art. 1116, at 642-43. The United States argued that the claims rightfully
belonged to LPA and therefore should have been brought by LPA under Article 1116 or
by Mondev on behalf of LPA under Article 1117. See Mondev Final Award, supra note
7, para. 2. Chapter 11, Article 1117 of NAFTA provides for a claim by an investor on
behalf of an enterprise. See NAFTA, supra note 13, art. 1117, at 643. Article 1119 of
NAFTA provides that all notices of intent to submit a claim for arbitration must include,
among other things, the name and address of the investor, or if brought on behalf of an
enterprise, the name and address of the enterprise. See id. art. 1117, at 643. The United
States argued that the claim could not be brought on behalf of LPA because Mondev had
failed to timely provide LPA's address to the Tribunal. See id. para. 49. Therefore, if
the United States was successful on its claim for lack of standing, there would have been
no remedy available to Mondev or LPA, because by that time LPA would have been
time-barred from bringing the claims on its own behalf. See Mondev Final Award, supra
note 7, para. 49.
120 See Mondev Final Award, supra note 7, para. 50. Article 1139 of NAFTA is a
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could, if needed, regard the claim as brought by Mondev on behalf
of LPA under Article 1117 because the only information not
provided by Mondev initially was the address of LPA. That
address was quickly provided after the notice of arbitration was
submitted. 1
21
The Tribunal found that Mondev's claims were properly
brought under Article 1116 on its own behalf.122 In the process,
the Tribunal differentiated between Article 1116 and Article
1117.123 After determining that Mondev's claims were brought
under an appropriate article, the only determination was whether
Mondev's interest was properly an "investment.' ' 124 The Tribunal
determined that Mondev's interests in the Hayward Parcel were
"investments" as they were "interests arising from the commitment
of capital or other resources in the territory of a Party to economic
activity in such territory."'' 25  The Tribunal therefore denied the
United States' objection to Mondev's standing. 26
c. Time Bar Objection
The third objection made by the United States was that
Mondev was time barred from bringing its NAFTA claims because
the arbitration was commenced more than three years after the
cited breaches. 127  Mondev asserted in response that the time bar
definitional section which provides, among of items, that the definition of an "investment
of an investor of a Party" is "an investment owned or controlled directly or indirectly by
an investor of such Party." NAFTA, supra note 13, art. 1139, at 647-48. Mondev
asserted that the Hayward project was an investment controlled indirectly by it through
LPA. See Mondev Final Award, supra note 7, para. 50.
121 See Mondev Final Award, supra note 7, para. 50.
122 See id. para. 80.
123 See id. para. 79. The Tribunal held that Article 1116 allows a foreign investor of
a party to NAFTA to bring an action in its own name for its own benefit or for the
benefit of a local enterprise that it owns and controls. Id. By contrast, Article 1117
simply allows a claim to be brought on behalf of an enterprise. Id. It expressly forbids
the enterprise from bringing the claim on its own behalf. id.
124 Id.
125 Id. See NAFTA, supra note 13, art. 1139(h), at 647-48.
126 Mondev Final Award, supra note 7, para. 83.
127 See id. para. 51. More specifically, the United States argued that the breaches
occurred at the latest on January 1, 1994, the date NAFTA took effect, and the arbitration
was not brought until 1999, thereby not brought within the three year limitations date
provided for under Article 1116(2). Id. The Article provides that "[an investor may not
make a claim if more than three years have elapsed from the date on which the investor
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
provision was only triggered when the company acquired
knowledge of the breach and knowledge of the loss or damage. 128
Because Mondev could not have known of its loss or damage until
the Massachusetts lawsuit and appeals were completed in 1998,
Mondev was clearly within the three-year time bar.129  The
Tribunal handily rejected the United States' time bar objection as a
result of the conclusions reached under the Article 1105
analysis.13
d Ownership of Claim Objection
The fourth and final preliminary objection raised by the United
States was that when LPA's lender, Manufacturers Hanover,
foreclosed on the mortgage over the entire project in 1991, it also
acquired all of LPA's rights in the Hayward Parcel option. Thus,
on January 1, 1994, Mondev had no investment, which NAFTA
could protect.'3' Mondev cited an express provision in the
mortgage deed between LPA and its lender, which excluded from
the mall deed any rights to the development of adjacent parcels,
including the Hayward Parcel.'32
The Tribunal was not required to decide upon the language of
the mortgage document to conclude that Mondev was the proper
owner of its claims.'33 The Tribunal concluded that NAFTA
first acquired, or should have first acquired, knowledge of the alleged breach and
knowledge that the investor has incurred loss or damage." NAFTA, supra note 13, art.
1116(2), at 643.
128 Mondev Final Award, supra note 7, para. 52.
129 See id.
130 See id para. 87. Since the Tribunal rejected Mondev's claims under Articles
1102 and 1110 in preliminary matters, only Mondev's Article 1105 claims remained.
See id. The record was clear that Mondev had commenced the arbitration proceedings
within three years of the United States court decisions, which was all that was required
under the Article 1105 analysis. See id.
131 See id. para. 54.
132 See id. para 55. Because of the express provision of the fact that Manufacturers
Hanover had never asserted ownership of the development rights to the Hayward Parcel,
Mondev still had an investment on January 1, 1994, which NAFTA could protect. See id.
133 See id. para. 90. First, LPA, a wholly owned subsidiary of Mondev, commenced
and conducted the Massachusetts litigation over the Hayward Parcel in its own name,
without objection by the United States. See id. Second, the Tribunal noted that certain
provisions of Chapter 11 of NAFTA, including Article 1105, require that the investment
in question has failed. See id. para. 91.
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should be interpreted broadly to cover legal claims arising out of
treatment of an investment, whether or not that investment is
surviving at the time of the wrongful treatment. 134 Having ruled on
all preliminary issues, the Tribunal was ready to determine the
merits of Mondev's claims under Article 1105.131
3. The Tribunal's Conclusions as to Mondev's Article
1105 Claim
The Tribunal's decisions on the preliminary matters raised by
the United States limited the scope of the Tribunal's review of the
merits to one claim only - Mondev's claims under Article 1105.136
The Tribunal had a two-fold task in regard to Mondev's Article
1105 claim: (a) interpreting Article 1105's provisions; and (b)
applying Article 1105 to the facts at issue.'37
a. Interpretation ofArticle 1105
To make interpretation of Article 1105 easier, the Tribunal
needed to limit the scope of interpretation. The Tribunal
determined that only subdivision (1) of Article 1105 was relevant
to Mondev's claims. 3 8 Further, because of the Tribunal's early
decisions on preliminary matters, the Tribunal was only concerned
with the aspect of Article 1105(1) which concerns the "standard of
treatment of aliens applicable to decisions of the host State's
courts or tribunals," commonly called "denial of justice." '139 The
Tribunal also recognized that it only needed to interpret Article
1105 in light of intangible property, including contract claims.14 °
134 See id.
135 See id. para. 92.
136 See id. Modev's Article 1105 claim alleged that the United States violated the
minimum standard of treatment that investors are allotted through a denial of justice in
U.S. courts. See id.
137 See id.
138 See id. Although the Tribunal did not explain why the other provisions of
Article 1105 did not apply to Mondev's claim, the express language of the Article makes
it clear. See id. Subsection (2) only applies where investments suffered as a result of
armed conflict or civil strife. Further, subsection (3) is an exclusionary provision, which
excludes subsidies or grants not at issue in the underlying dispute. NAFTA, supra note
13, art. 1105(2), at 639-40.
139 Mondev Final Award, supra note 7, para. 96.
140 See id para. 98.
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The Tribunal faced three issues in its interpretation of Article
1105: (1) the extent to which the Free Trade Commission's
("FTC") interpretation of Article 1105 was binding; (2) the scope
of "customary" international law under Article 1105 and the
FTC's interpretation; and (3) the applicable standard for denial of
justice. "4
i. The Binding Effect of the FTC's Interpretation
ofArticle 1105
Article 1131 provides that any interpretation of NAFTA by the
"Commission" shall be binding upon any Tribunal established
under Chapter 11.142 The term "Commission" refers to the FTC,
which is established pursuant to Article 2001 of NAFTA.143
141 See id. para. 94.
142 Id. para. 100. Article 1131 of NAFTA provides:
Article 1131: Governing Law
1. A Tribunal established under this Section shall decide the issues in dispute in
accordance with this Agreement and applicable rules of international law.
2. An interpretation by the Commission of a provision of this Agreement shall
be binding on a Tribunal established under this Section.
NAFTA, supra note 13, art. 1131, at 645
143 Mondev Final Award, supra note 7, para. 100. Article 2001 of NAFTA
provides:
Article 2001: The Free Trade Commission
1. The Parties hereby establish the Free Trade Commission, comprising cabinet-
level representatives of the Parties or their designees.
2. The Commission shall:
(a) supervise the implementation of this Agreement;
(b) oversee its further elaboration;
(c) resolve disputes that may arise regarding its interpretation or application;
(d) supervise the work of all committees and working groups established under
this Agreement, referred to in Annex 2001.2; and
(e) consider any other matter that may affect the operation of this Agreement.
3. The Commission may:
(a) establish, and delegate responsibilities to, ad hoc or standing committees,
working groups or expert groups;
(b) seek the advice of non-governmental persons or groups; and
(c) take such other action in the exercise of its functions as the Parties may
agree.
4. The Commission shall establish its rules and procedures. All decisions of the
Commission shall be taken by consensus, except as the Commission may
otherwise agree.
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Pursuant to the FTC's established powers, the FTC adopted an
interpretation of Chapter 11 of NAFTA on July 31, 2001 for the
stated purpose to "reaffirm the meaning of certain of its
provisions.""' One such provision that the FTC clarified was the
meaning of the term "minimum standard of treatment" under
Article 1105.141 Mondev objected to the FTC interpretation's
application. 146  The United States, recognizing the benefit of the
FTC interpretation, pushed for its application. 47  The Mondev
Tribunal conceded the binding nature of the FTC interpretation. 48
5. The Commission shall convene at least once a year in regular session.
Regular sessions of the Commission shall be chaired successively by each Party.
NAFTA, supra note 13, art. 2001, at 693.
144 Mondev Final Award, supra note 7, para. 101.
145 Id. The FTC interpreted Article 1105 as follows:
B. Minimum Standard of Treatment in Accordance with International Law
1. Article 1105(1) prescribes the customary international law minimum
standard of treatment of aliens as the minimum standard of treatment to be
afforded to investments of investors of another Party.
2. The concepts of 'fair and equitable treatment' and 'full protection and
security' do not require treatment in addition to or beyond that which is
required by the customary international law minimum standard of treatment of
aliens.
3. A determination that there has been a breach of another provision of
the NAFTA, or of a separate international agreement, does not establish that
there has been a breach of Article 1105(1).
Id.
146 Id. Mondev was "bewildered" that the FTC could change the interpretation of a
provision midway through a case in which the provision played a major role. Id. para.
102. Mondev argued that the "interpretation" was more of an amendment to NAFTA
because it contradicted the "judicially found meaning of the text" in three previous
NAFTA arbitrations. Id. By making the "fair and equitable treatment" and "full
protection and security" determinable by the minimum standard of customary
international law, Mondev asserted that the FTC had significantly lowered the standard.
See id. If the interpretation was binding, Mondev argued, customary international law
must be given its current content, reflecting current investment treaties and arbitration
decisions. Id.
147 Idpara. 103. The United States argued that the interpretation was the "definitive
statement of what the Parties intended from the source designated by the Treaty as the
ultimate and most authoritative source of its meaning, the Parties themselves." Id. The
United States asserted that the FTC released the interpretation in good faith to correct
what the FTC believed were "misinterpretations" of Article 1105 by earlier arbitration
tribunals. Id.
148 !dpara. 119. This was not the first time since the release of the FTC interpretation
that an arbitration tribunal had to determine its effect. See id. para. 105. In a damage
award released on May 31, 2000 by a tribunal in the case of Pope & Talbot Inc.. v.
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2. The Scope of "Customary" International Law
After accepting the FTC's interpretation that establishes
customary international law, as the determinate of what is "fair
and equitable treatment" and "full protection and security," the
second interpretational problem was to determine the exact sources
of customary international law to be referenced. 49 Canada, in an
amicus curiae submission, suggested that the Tribunal use the
meaning of those provisions as established by a case before the
Mexican Claims Commission in 1926.150 The Tribunal rejected
Canada's suggestion and concluded that the standard of treatment
is to be found by reference to the normal sources of international
law determining the minimum standards of treatment of foreign
Canada, that Tribunal suggested that it was not bound by the FTC interpretation. See
Pope & Talbot Inc. v. Canada, Award on Damages (May 31, 2002), para. 66, at
http://www.appletonlaw.com/cases/Pope_%20Award%2ORe%20Damages-May31-
02.pdf (on file with the NORTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
COMMERCIAL REGULATION). The Tribunal noted that NAFTA treats issues of
interpretation (Article 2001(2)) and amendment (Article 2202) differently, and that it was
for the Tribunal to determine whether the FTC release could be qualified as an
"interpretation." Mondev Final Award, supra note 7, para. 105. The Tribunal concluded
that even if the interpretation was binding, it would not change the outcome of the
decision in Pope & Talbot. Id. para. 105. Following the Pope & Talbot Tribunal's
decision, the United States, Mexico, and Canada all submitted letters of comment to that
tribunal asserting that their release was properly an "interpretation" and was binding
upon all NAFTA tribunals. Id. paras. 106-09. In the end, the Mondev Tribunal did not
explicitly hold that it was bound by the FTC interpretation, but the Tribunal noted that it
could not "simply adopt its own idiosyncratic standard of what is 'fair' or 'equitable,'
without reference to established sources of law." See id. paras. 119-120. The Mondev
Tribunal's discussion following the binding nature of the interpretation shows that the
Tribunal believed it was. Id. para. 120.
149 Mondev Final Award, supra note 7, para. 113.
150 Id. para. 114. That Commission laid down a requirement that, for there to be a
breach of international law, "the treatment of an alien.., should amount to an outrage, to
bad faith, to wilful neglect of duty, or to an insufficiency of governmental action so far
short of international standards that every reasonable and impartial man would readily
recognize its insufficiency." L.F. Neer Case (U.S. v. Mex.), 3 I.L.R. 213-14 (Mex. Cl.
Comm'n. 1926), 21 AM. J. INT'L L. 555, 556 (Decision of General Claims Commission,
Oct. 15, 1926). The Tribunal rejected this invitation for three reasons: (1) because the
Mexican Claims Commission was concerned with the physical security of an alien, not
the treatment of a foreign investment; (2) the Commission cases were outdated as they
were decided in a time when the protection of foreign investments were far less
developed than currently; and (3) the more than 2000 bilateral and regional investment
treaties are better sources since they provide almost uniformly for fair and equitable
treatment of foreign investors. Mondev Final Award, supra note 7, paras. 115-17.
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investors.'5
3. The Applicable Standard of Denial of Justice
Mondev's Article 1105 claim arose out of the failure of the
United States judicial system to provide it with a remedy.' As a
result, the Tribunal had to determine the applicable standard of
denial of justice. 53  The Tribunal referenced a prior standard
adopted by another NAFTA tribunal, which phrased denial of
justice as "a wilful disregard of due process of law,... which
shocks, or at least surprises, a sense of judicial propriety."'' 5 4 The
Mondev Tribunal clarified, however, that:
The test for denial of justice is not whether a particular result is
surprising, but whether the shock or surprise occasioned to an
impartial tribunal leads, on reflection, to justified concerns as to
the judicial propriety of the outcome, bearing in mind on the one
hand that international tribunals are not courts of appeal, and on
the other hand that Chapter 11 of NAFTA (like other treaties for
the protection of investments) is intended to provide a real
measure of protection.' 55
151 Mondev Final Award, supra note 7, para. 120. All parties agreed that the
standard of treatment applicable here was not that as it necessarily existed at the time
NAFTA went into force in 1994, but that it is an evolutionary standard that incorporates
a changing definition of fairness and equity. See id. paras. 123-25.
152 See id. para. 126.
153 See id. The Tribunal noted that NAFTA provides parties the option of seeking
local remedies, but NAFTA tribunals should not function as courts of appeal. Id. The
Tribunal quoted a prior NAFTA tribunal in Azinian v. United Mexican States which held
that "[t]he possibility of holding a State internationally liable for judicial decisions does
not, however, entitle a claimant to seek international review of the national court
decisions as though the international jurisdiction seized has plenary appellate
jurisdiction. This is not true generally, and it is not true for NAFTA." Azinian Final
Award, supra note 34, para. 99, at http://www.worldbank.org /icsid/cases/robert_
award.pdf (on file with the North Carolina Journal of International Law and
Commercial Regulation). The Azinian Tribunal recognized that denials of justice
occurred when (1) Courts refused to entertain a suit; (2) Courts subject suit to undue
delay; (3) Courts administer justice in a seriously inadequate way; and (4) Courts clearly
maliciously misapply the law. Id. paras. 102-03.
154 Elettronica Sicula S.P.A. (ELSI) (U.S. v. Italy), 1989 I.C.J. 15 (Judgment of July
20), at 76, para. 128 (citing Asylum (Colum. v. Peru), 1950 I.C.J. 266 (Judgment of
November 20), at 284, which referred to the arbitrary action as being "substituted for the
rule of law").
155 Mondev Final Award, supra note 7, para. 127. The Tribunal also concluded that:
In the end the question is whether, at an international level and
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
After deciding all issues of interpretation of Article 1105 and
laying out the standard for denial of justice, the Tribunal was ready
to apply Article 1105 to Mondev's claims.
1 56
b. Application ofArticle 1105
Mondev questioned the decisions of the U.S. courts, by and
through the SJC, on four grounds: (1) the Superior Court's
dismissal of the contract claim against the city; (2) the SJC's
failure to remand the contract claim for further findings; (3) the
SJC's failure to consider whether they retrospectively applied a
new rule as to contract claims; and (4) BRA's statutory
immunity. 57 The Tribunal responded to these issues in turn.
i. Dismissal of the Contract Claim Against the
City of Boston
The first of Mondev's grounds for denial of justice was based
on the finding by the SJC that the City of Boston was not in breach
of contract. 5 8  Mondev argued that the SJC's decision was a
"significant and serious departure" from its previous decisions and
therefore the SJC's dismissal of the contract claim "was arbitrary
and profoundly unjust." '159 The United States responded that the
SJC acted reasonably within its previous decisions and did not
apply any new law.16°
The Tribunal rejected Mondev's arguments that the SJC's
having regard to generally accepted standards of the administration
of justice, a tribunal can conclude in the light of all the available
facts that the impugned decision was clearly improper and
discreditable, with the result that the investment has been subjected
to unfair and inequitable treatment.
Id.
156 Id. para. 128.
157 Id. The SJC held that because neither LPA nor Campeau initiated the price
appraisal process or activated the arbitration process to resolve their remaining
differences with BRA, neither party could be ready, able, and willing to close at the
designated time. Lafayette Place Assocs. v. Boston Redevelopment Auth., 694 N.E.2d
820, 828 (Mass. 1998). Therefore, since neither party tendered performance, neither
party was in breach of the bilateral contract. Id.
158 Mondev Final Award, supra note 7, para. 128.
159 Id. para. 131.
160 Id. para. 132.
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decision as to the contract claim created a denial of justice. 6' The
Tribunal determined that the SJC's decision fell within the limits
of common law jurisprudence and that "there is nothing here to
shock or surprise even a delicate judicial sensibility."' 6 2
ii. SJC's Failure to Remand the Contract Claim
Mondev's second ground for denial of justice was that even if
the SJC properly applied the law, it should have remanded the case
back to the superior court so that a jury could determine whether
LPA was indeed able and willing to perform under the bilateral
contract.'63 The United States argued in response that the SJC had
broad discretion to determine whether to remand the question to
the trial court under Massachusetts law and judicial practice.'"
The Tribunal agreed with the United States on Mondev's
second ground that questions of "fact-finding on appeal are
quintessentially matters of local procedural practice."' 65  The
Tribunal recognized that adopting Mondev's argument would
place NAFTA tribunals in a wrongful position as courts of appeal
of domestic courts.'66 Additionally, only in extreme cases not
existing here, could such procedural rules as the fact-finding
function of a court violate the standards of Article 1 105.167
iii. SIC's Failure to Consider Whether They
Retrospectively Applied a New Rule
The Tribunal summarily rejected Mondev's third ground for
denial of justice, as it was closely tied to Mondev's claim
regarding the wrongful denial of LPA's contract claim against the
city. 68 The Tribunal found that no new law had been applied. 69
The Tribunal briefly concluded that it is a matter for local courts,
not international tribunals, to determine whether, and in what
161 Id. para. 133.
162 Id.
163 Id. para. 135.
164 Id.
165 Id. para. 136.
166 Id.
167 Id.
168 Id. para. 137.
169 Id.
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circumstances, new law may be applied retrospectively.17 °
iv. BRA "s Statutory Immunity
The last of Mondev's grounds for denial of justice was that
conferring immunity from suit upon a NAFTA Party's public
authorities is itself a denial ofjustice. 17' The United States counter
argued that there is no consensus in international practice as to the
granting of immunity to statutory authorities and that any limited
immunity granted by the United States to BRA did not contravene
Article 1105(l).172
The Tribunal looked to analogous cases to determine the effect
of BRA's immunity, primarily to cases before the European Court
of Human Rights.'73 The Tribunal also examined the rationale
behind exempting public authority from liability for intentional
torts. 174  The Tribunal concluded that the limited immunity
provided by Massachusetts law to BRA was not, in this case, a
denial of justice.175
v. Conclusion
The Tribunal dismissed all of Mondev's claims in their entirety
and decided that all parties would bear their own costs associated
with the arbitration. 176
IV. Implications
Mondev International Ltd. v. United States is one of a growing
number of disputes brought before arbitration panels, pursuant to
the dispute resolution clauses of NAFTA, that are steadily
expanding the jurisdictional authority of international institutions.
Although only Mondev's Article 1105 claim reached final
170 Id.
171 Id. para. 140.
172 Id.
173 Id. para. 141. The Tribunal recognized that the European Court of Human
Rights has held that "the conferral of immunity in ways recognized in international
practice does not involve a denial of access to a court .... Id.
174 See id. paras. 145-50.
175 Id. para. 154.
176 Id. paras. 157-59.
177 Curtis A. Bradley, International Delegations, the Structural Constitution, and
Non-Self-Execution, 55 STAN. L. REv. 1557, 1577 (2003).
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determination before the Tribunal and it was subsequently dismissed,
the Tribunal's decision is significant for its impact on future
Chapter 11 disputes for several reasons: (1) it helps to dispel
concerns over Chapter I I's threat to national sovereignty;178 (2) it
clarifies when a claim is brought on behalf of an investor (Article
1116) and when a claim is brought on behalf of an enterprise
(Article 11 17);179 and (3) it affirms the application of "customary
international law" to Article 1105(1) claims. 180
A. Threat to Sovereignty
Critics of NAFTA's Chapter 11 investor protection provisions
and arbitration clauses have almost unanimously attacked Chapter
1 1 as a threat to national sovereignty. 8' The quasi-constitutional
structure of NAFTA and its investor-related guarantees offer
incentives for economic growth, while removing the decision-
making authority from the party states and their governmental
subdivisions. 82 The Mondev arbitration adds to these globalization
178 See infra notes 181-218 and accompanying text.
179 See infra notes 219-31 and accompanying text.
180 See infra notes 232-39 and accompanying text.
181 For the most comprehensive critiques of NAFTA's Chapter 11 presently
available, see Howard Mann & Konrad von Moltke, NAFTA 's Chapter 11 and the
Environment: Addressing the Impacts of the Investor-State Process on the Environment,
(Intl Inst. for Sustainable Dev., 1999), at http://www.iisd.org/trade/chapterl l.htm (on file
with the North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation);
Alvarez & Park, supra note 26. See also David A. Gantz, Reconciling Environmental
Protection and Investor Rights Under Chapter 11 of NAFTA, 31 ENvTL. L. REP. 10,646,
10,986 (2001); William T. Waren, Paying to Regulate: A Guide to Methanex v. United
States and NAFTA Investor Rights, 31 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,986 (2001); Julia Ferguson,
Note, California's MTBE Contaminated Water: An Illustration of the Need for an
Environmental Interpretive Note on Article 1110 of NAFTA, 11 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L.
& POL'Y 499 (2000); Daniel R. Loritz, Comment, Corporate Predators Attack
Environmental Regulations: It's Time to Arbitrate Claims Filed Under NAFTA's
Chapter 11, 22 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 533 (2000); Howard Mann, NAFTA
and the Environment: Lessons for the Future, 13 TuL. ENVTL. L.J. 387, 402-07 (2000);
Kevin Banks, NAFTA 's Article 1110--Can Regulation Be Expropriation?, 5 NAFTA L.
& Bus. REv. AM. 499 (1999); Samrat Ganguly, Note, The Investor-State Dispute
Mechanism (ISDM) and a Sovereign's Power to Protect Public Health, 38 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 113 (1999); Julie A. Soloway, Environmental Trade Barriers Under
NAFTA: The MMT Fuel Additives Controversy, 8 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 55 (1999); J.
Martin Wagner, International Investment, Expropriation and Environmental Protection,
29 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 465 (1999); David Schneiderman, NAFTA 's Takings Rule:
American Constitutionalism Comes to Canada, 46 U. TORONTO L.J. 499 (1996).
182 See infra notes 212 - 218 and accompanying text.
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concerns because it can be seen as a threat to sovereignty in three
ways: (1) by creating a framework whereby domestic takings law
is trumped by international agreement;183 (2) by creating a
multinational, binding court of appeals that can review decisions
of the highest domestic courts;'84 and (3) by creating an
environment whereby issues of state sovereign immunity can be
reviewed by non-nationals.'85
1. Takings Ramifications
The three signatories to NAFTA have markedly different
domestic constitutional provisions and laws regarding the
expropriation and compensation of private property.'86 Of the
183 See infra notes 186 - 201 and accompanying text.
184 See infra notes 202 - 211 and accompanying text.
185 See infra notes 212 - 218 and accompanying text.
186 The Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides, "[N]or shall private
property be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
Legislative authority to expropriate and regulate property in the United States is limited
by this constitutional protection against uncompensated "takings." Id. By contrast,
Canada's legislative power to expropriate property is less limited, because there is no
explicit language in the Canadian Constitution preventing these "takings" nor a
requirement that compensation be paid. Gregory M. Stamer, Taking a Constitutional
Look: NAFTA Chapter II as an Extension of Member States' Constitutional Protection
of Property, 33 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 405, 409 (2002). By further contrast, Mexico
has a constitutional provision regarding expropriation, but it gives the Mexican
government broad authority to both regulate and to expropriate private property in the
"public interest." MEX. CONST. ch. I, art. 27. Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution
provides in part:
Private property shall not be expropriated except for reasons of public use and
subject to payment of indemnity.
The Nation shall at all times have the right to impose on private property such
limitations as the public interest may demand, as well as the right to regulate the
utilization of natural resources which are susceptible of appropriation, in order
to conserve them and to ensure a more equitable distribution of public wealth.
With this end in view, necessary measures shall be taken to divide up large
landed estates; to develop small landed holdings in operation; to create new
agricultural centers, with necessary lands and waters; to encourage agriculture
in general and to prevent the destruction of natural resources, and to protect
property from damage to the detriment of society. Centers of population which
at present either have no lands or water or which do not possess them in
sufficient quantities for the needs of their inhabitants, shall be entitled to grants
thereof, which shall be taken from adjacent properties, the rights of small landed
holdings in operation being respected at all times.
Id. (Emphasis added).
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three signatories, NAFTA's expropriation provisions in Article
1110 most closely resemble the United States' takings laws." 7
The express language of the Article incorporates provisions similar
to both the Fifth Amendment's protection against takings and the
Fourteenth Amendment's due process guarantees.'88 Additionally,
key principles of United States' takings jurisprudence have been
incorporated into several of the NAFTA tribunal decisions under
Article 1 1 10.89
NAFTA's expropriation provisions are much more restrictive
than those of either Canada or Mexico. Canada voiced concerns
indicating that NAFTA and NAFTA takings arbitrations represent
a significant departure from Canadian takings law.' 90 Canada
urged the United States and Mexico for an interpretation of Article
1110 that would define the grounds for finding an expropriation
requiring compensation narrowly.' 9' Additionally, Canada raised
concern that NAFTA's foreign investment provisions have the
effect of preventing the government from enacting legitimate
regulations on property. 92 Canada is not alone in its concern.
Mexico's NAFTA obligations clash with its own constitutional
provisions and the Mexican government has met with considerable
domestic opposition as a result of NAFTA's foreign investment
policies.' 93
187 Starner, supra note 186, at 427.
188 Id. As one author, Gregory M. Starner, states:
Article 1110's prohibition against nationalization or expropriation of
investments mirrors the Fifth Amendment's explicit prohibition against takings
of private property. In addition, article I 110's enumeration of the factors
constituting a legitimate taking-i.e., done for a public purpose, on a non-
discriminatory basis, in accordance with due process of law, and on payment of
adequate compensation-includes elements of both the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments. Both article 1110 and the Fifth Amendment require a public
purpose and compensation. Additionally, both article 1110 and the Fourteenth
Amendment require due process of law and non-discrimination.
Id.
189 Id. at 428.
190 Edward Alden, Canada Seeks Tighter NAFTA Rules to Limit Compensation;
Trade Pact Curbs Sought on Ability of Companies to Sue Governments, FIN. TIMES
(London), Jan. 22, 1999, at 14.
191 Id.
192 Id.
193 Id.
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The concerns lie in practice, not necessarily in theory. In
practice, multinational corporations are bringing expropriation
claims before arbitration tribunals that would never be acceptable
under the Fifth Amendment's takings clause, let alone under
Canada or Mexico's less protective domestic law.'94 Under
international law, which is the law applied by the NAFTA
tribunals, an action that "unreasonably interferes" with "effective
enjoyment" of an alien's property amounts to expropriation. 95
Therefore, an investor could argue that govermment regulation that
makes an investment less profitable is an expropriation.1 96 These
arguments would not be accepted by the domestic courts of any of
the three NAFTA participants, because even the relatively
protective U.S. domestic law draws a line more narrowly, making
these types of claims unsuccessful. 97
The fears of the critics were not realized with Mondev. The
Mondev Tribunal took great care in dismissing Mondev's
expropriation claims in preliminary matters. The Tribunal rejected
the takings claim for not being adequately asserted and
maintained, 98 as being mooted by the mortgage foreclosure, 99 as
not being a breach of customary international law,2"0 and as not
affected by the grant of statutory immunity to BRA or included in
the denial of justice claim."0 ' The Tribunal delicately sidestepped,
by refusing to address Mondev's takings claim, what could have
resulted in a further relaxation of the NAFTA expropriation
standards. By dismissing Mondev's Article 1110 claims, the
Tribunal recommitted itself, at least procedurally, to respecting the
194 William T. Warren, NAFTA and State Sovereignty: A Pandora's Box of Property
Rights, 75-2 SPECTRUM: J. ST. Gov'T 21-22 (2002).
195 Id. at 22. This concern especially arises in the context of environmental
protection regulations. See generally Madeline Stone, NAFTA Article 1110:
Environmental Friend or Foe?, 15 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REv. 763 (2003).
196 Warren, supra note 194, at 22. In one current arbitration, a Vancouver-based
methanol manufacturing company is claiming just that and has brought takings claims
against the United States for a California regulation banning a methanol product. See
Methanex Second Amended Statement of Claim, supra note 38 and accompanying text.
197 Warren, supra note 194, at 22; see also Methanex Second Amended Statement of
Claim, supra note 38 and accompanying text
198 Mondev Final Award, supra note 7, para. 60.
199 Id. paras. 72-73.
200 Id. para. 74.
201 Id. para. 154.
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already pressed boundaries of the international takings cases.
2. NAFTA Arbitration as International Appeals Court
Critics of Chapter 11 have cited Mondev as having the
potential to effectively make the NAFTA arbitration tribunals
international courts of appeals, thereby reviewing the application
of domestic law by domestic courts. °2 These concerns result from
Mondev's denial of justice claim that attacked the everyday
workings of the U.S. judicial system.20 3 Mondev was the second
arbitration brought under Article 1105(1) for denials of justice
against the U.S. judicial system, but has the distinction of being
the first case to base part of its claim upon the actions of the U.S.
Supreme Court.20 4 Although the allegations against the U.S.
Supreme Court are not the central claim of Mondev's case,
invoking NAFTA to challenge the U.S. Supreme Court's refusal of
appeal has staggering implications.20 5
Again, the fears of the critics, at least as to Mondev's
implications, remain unfounded. Although the Tribunal did not
202 See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
203 See Mondev Final Award, supra note 7, paras. 93-156.
204 Chris Mooney, In Our Own Back Yard, BOST. PHOENIX, Aug. 30 - Sept. 6, 2001,
at http://www.bostonphoenix.com/boston/news_features/top/features/documents/
01791880.htm (on file with the North Carolina Journal of International Law and
Commercial Regulation). Not only did Mondev argue that the Massachusetts Superior
Court and the SJC misinterpreted and misapplied the law, but a portion of his denial of
justice claim turned upon the U.S. Supreme Court's refusal to hear his appeal from the
SJC. See Mondev Final Award, supra note 7, paras. 70, 128. In a pending arbitration,
Loewen v. United States, a Canadian funeral home chain objected to a large punitive
damage award against the corporation, which is allowed under Mississippi law to deter
fraud. Loewen v. United States, Notice of Arbitration (Oct. 30, 1998), para. 3, at
http://www.international-economic-law.org/Loewen/loewen.pdf (on file with the North
Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation). Loewen also
objected to a Mississippi requirement, similar to that of many other states, that a bond
must be posted before such an award can be appealed. Id. paras. 5-6. Loewen is asking
for $725 million in damages from the United States. Id. para. 178. Both claims were
part of Loewen's denial of justice claim. Id. para. 7.
205 See Loewen, supra note 204, para. 7. With the Supreme Court deciding on
average, fifty cases per year and turning down thousands, will each refusal that involves
a Canadian or Mexican company become potential grounds for a NAFTA claim?
Mooney, supra note 204. The implications are even larger if NAFTA's Chapter 11
provisions are adopted in other bilateral or multilateral treaties. Id. Potentially,
arbitration provisions could allow hundreds of unsatisfied investors without domestic
remedies to bring claims second guessing the decisions of the U.S. judicial system. Id.
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outwardly reject Mondev's claims for lack of jurisdiction, the
Tribunal performed self-regulation by limiting their standard of
review in denial of justice claims.2 °6 The Tribunal recognized the
line between ruling on "unremedied acts of the local constabulary
and... second-guess[ing] the reasoned decisions of the highest
courts of a State., 207 In the end, the Tribunal's logic was clear - if
parties choose the option to seek local remedies and then lose on
the merits, it is not the function of NAFTA tribunals to act as
courts of appeal.2 °8
NAFTA tribunals must maintain a careful balance in reviewing
domestic court decisions, because although there are advantages
and disadvantages, the disadvantages weigh heavily. The primary
advantage is that direct appellate review by NAFTA tribunals
provides protection to investors from "biased, inefficient or
unfamiliar courts of their host states., 209  The disadvantages are
more numerous. Direct review by arbitration panels has been
characterized as "less determinate, less accountable, less
legitimate, and more intrusive on national sovereignty. 21 0  In
Mondev, the Tribunal struck a good balance in hesitating to
interfere with the judicial process of a signatory state. It adopted a
standard of review for denial of justice that would not interfere
with the domestic judicial process while still providing guarantees
to investors of equity and fairness for the adjudication of their
grievances. The test as adopted was a recommitment to the
purpose of the arbitration clause itself."' That is, to provide a real
measure of protection for investors against unfair and inequitable
treatment from biased and partial judicial systems.212
206 Mooney, supra note 204.
207 Mondev Final Award, supra note 7, para. 126.
208 Id. para. 136; see also Rudolph Kass, How Sharp Are the Tiger's Teeth?
Private Actions Under NAFTA, 47-OCT B. B.J. 10, 12 (2003).
209 William S. Dodge, Loewen v. United States: Trials and Errors Under NAFTA
Chapter Eleven, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 563, 570 (2002). This is particularly significant
when a treaty is between less developed countries, but less so when between such actors
as the United States and Canada. Id. at 570.
210 Id.
211 Mondev Final Award, supra note 7, para. 127.
212 Id. The United States attempted to defeat Mondev's arbitration claims for lack
of standing, arguing that the claims really belonged to LPA, the joint venture. Id. para.
49. Mondev rebutted that by definition, it was an investor for purposes of NAFTA and
therefore had standing to bring its claims. Id. para. 50.
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3. Challenge to Sovereign Immunity
The third prong of attack on sovereignty is the critics' concern
over Mondev's claims that the application of sovereign immunity
itself was a denial of justice." 3 Mondev's arguments conflict with
U.S. domestic law. In 1999, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in
Alden v. Maine,1 4 that "the immunity of a sovereign in its own
courts has always been understood to be within the sole control of
the sovereign itself.", 2 5 The five-to-four majority upheld and even
strengthened state sovereign immunity in a case that argued that
the federal Fair Labor Standards Act could not force states to be
sued without their consent." 6  U.S. Supreme Court Justice
Kennedy observed that state governments would face possible
financial hardship if such suits were unconditionally allowed.
1 7
Again, it is not the result, but the potential that is frightening to
critics. In the end, the Mondev Tribunal was unimpressed by the
argument and concluded that BRA was subject to sovereign
immunity and that such immunity did not conflict with customary
international law. But NAFTA provides Mondev with the chance
to circumvent a democratically enacted Massachusetts law - a
privilege that neither Massachusetts citizens nor American
corporations have and that Mondev retains solely by virtue of
being a foreign corporation. 2 8 Because NAFTA makes this result
possible, it weakens a state's ability to govern within its borders,
thus shifting the federal balance of power between state and
national government to the latter and questioning sovereignty
itself.219 Additionally, the practical effects of rejecting the BRA's
sovereign immunity would wreak havoc on administrative
213 Warren, supra note 194, at 22 (Mondev "has important implications for
America's federal system, given the states' 1 th amendment right to sovereign immunity
and recent U.S. Supreme Court cases giving an expansive reading to that right").
214 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
215 Id. at 749.
216 Id. at 706, 710.
217 Id. at 709. The majority held that "[i]t is indisputable that, at the time of the
founding, many of the States could have been forced into insolvency but for their
immunity from private suits for money damages." Id. at 750. But in his dissent, Justice
Souter argued that there was no real consensus on the meaning or scope of sovereign
immunity at the time of the founding. Id. at 769-72.
218 Mooney, supra note 203.
219 Id.
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agencies. Because agencies routinely interfere with parties'
contract expectations, recognizing liability for these intentional
actions would open the courthouse doors to a wide range of
litigation and effectively hobble the government's workhorse.
B. Claim on Behalf of Investor v. Claim on Behalf of
Enterprise
The Tribunal's ruling served to clarify the procedural
requirements of Article 1117. When the Tribunal ruled that
Mondev had standing, its logic was not intuitive.22' Mondev
clearly believed it was bringing a claim on behalf of LPA.222 It
amended its notice of intent to arbitrate midway through the
arbitration to add the address of LPA.223  Further, Mondev
submitted a consent and waiver on behalf of itself and LPA when
it filed its notice of intent to arbitrate. 24 There was no doubt that
Mondev had not fulfilled the requirements of bringing the claims
on behalf of LPA under Article 1117.225 Therefore, Mondev's
claims failed procedurally under NAFTA.226
The Tribunal refused to apply the formal requirements of the
Chapter 11 provisions to differentiate between the Article 1116
and 1117 claims.227  The Tribunal looked to the spirit of Article
1117, determining it to be a measure protecting creditors of the
enterprise from having arbitration verdicts siphoned directly to the
220 Kass, supra note 208, at 12.
221 Article 1117 clearly grants a procedure whereby an investor may present a claim
on behalf of an enterprise controlled, directly or indirectly. See NAFTA, supra note 13,
art. 1117(1), at 643. The Article places a three-year time bar upon claims brought on
behalf of an enterprise from the date the enterprise first knew or should have known of
the breach and resulting damage. Id. art. 1117(2), at 643. A claimant under Article 1117
must first file a notice of intent to arbitrate under Article 1119, which must include
among other things, the name and address of the enterprise. Id. art. 1119(a), at 643.
Additionally, for claims brought on behalf of an enterprise, both the investor and the
enterprise must consent to the arbitration and waive their rights to pursue other legal
forums. Id. art. 1121(2), at 643.
222 Mondev Final Award, supra note 7, para. 50.
223 Id.
224 Id. para. 85.
225 Id. para. 49.
226 Id.
227 Id. para. 86.
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investor. 28 The Tribunal noted that "[i]nternational law does not
place emphasis on merely formal considerations, nor does it
require new proceedings to be commenced where a merely
procedural defect is involved., 229 Realizing that it was loosely
interpreting NAFTA's provisions, the Tribunal cautioned other
tribunals not to disregard the differences between Chapters 1116
and I 117, and then it proceeded to do so itself.
23 °
The Tribunal rationalized that it could treat a claim brought
under Chapter 1116 "as in truth brought under Article 1117,
provided there has been clear disclosure in the Article 1119 notice
of the substance of the claim, compliance with Article 1121 and no
prejudice to the Respondent State or third parties. 23' Concluding
that there was no evidence of material nondisclosure or prejudice
to the United States, the Tribunal passed on the invitation to
interpret the enterprise provisions strictly.
23 2
The decision of the Tribunal in Mondev may open the door to
procedural abuse as well as loose interpretation of NAFTA's
provisions, but there is a careful balance to uphold. With concerns
by all signatories that NAFTA's arbitration panels are treading
upon domestic sovereignty, the Tribunals must be careful to act
within the express guidelines of NAFTA. However, Tribunals
cannot be overzealous in their procedural applications as the
waiver requirement in Article 1121 may leave claimants with no
other remedy once they file their notice of intent to proceed with
arbitration.
C. Application of "Customary International Law " to Article
1105(1) Claims
Mondev's notice of arbitration, which contained the claimant's
statement of claims and legal arguments, was filed on September
1, 1999.233 During the course of the arbitration, the FTC issued an
interpretation of NAFTA Article 1105(1) on July 31, 2001, which
served to change the minimum standard of treatment in the Article
228 Id. para. 84.
229 Id. para. 86.
230 Id.
231 Id.
232 Id.
233 See Mondev Final Award, supra note 7, para. 12.
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from that of "international law" to that of "customary international
law., 234 The implications were tremendously adverse for Mondev
as the content of "international law" is much broader than that of
"customary international law., 235  The Tribunal in Mondev
resigned itself to the fact that the FTC's interpretation was binding
upon the Tribunal and adopted the interpretation as the standard.236
By adopting the FTC's interpretation,237 the Tribunal impacted
future arbitrations in two ways: (1) it bound future arbitration
tribunals to the will of the FTC; and (2) it bound future arbitrations
to a new minimum standard of treatment for foreign investors.
This essentially served to provide a lower standard of protection
and helped shape the terms of subsequent free trade agreements. 238
The Tribunal had little choice in its decision. First, the
authority of the FTC to make interpretations is provided for within
NAFTA.239 Second, all three signatories supported the July 31,
2001 interpretation and pressured the Tribunal for its adoption.24 °
Third, even if the Tribunal rejected the language as an
234 Id. paras. 101-25.
235 Id. In fact, Article 38 of the I.C.J. makes it clear that there are four sources of
international law, of which custom is only one. Statute of the I.C.J., June 26, 1945, art.
38, 59 Stat. 1055, 1060, T.S. No. 933. Article 38 provides that the following are sources
of international law:
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules
expressly recognized by the contesting states;
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of
the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means
for the determination of rules of law.
Statute of the I.C.J., June 26, 1945, art. 38, 59 Stat. 1055, 1060, T.S. No. 933.
236 See Mondev Final Award, supra note 7, para. 113.
237 Controversy exists as to whether the FTC had the authority to issue the statement
and whether the statement should bind current and future arbitrations. For a discussion
of these concerns, see Stefan Matiation, Arbitration With Two Twists: Lowen v. United
States and Free Trade Commission Intervention in NAFTA Chapter 11 Disputes, 24 U.
PA. J. INT'L. ECON. L. 451, 468-507 (2003).
238 For example, the U.S. Chile Free Trade Agreement explicitly provides
for the customary international law standard of treatment, assuring no dispute
over the language and the potential for a broadened theory of protection. Sean
D. Murphy, U.S. -Chile Free Trade Agreement, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 696, 697
(2003).
239 Mondev Final Award, supra note 7, para. 100.
240 Id. paras. 106, 108, 109.
[Vol. 29
2003] MONDEV INTERNATIONAL LTD. V. UNITED STATES 387
"interpretation," the amendment process in NAFTA still would
have provided the signatories with an avenue for change.24" '
Fourth, a complete disregard of FTC authority and the will of the
signatories would have brought substantial consequences upon the
professional lives of the individual arbiters and their relationship
to the Chapter 11 arbitration process.242
V. Conclusion
The decision in Mondev International Ltd. v. United States is
the latest in a growing number of international arbitrations brought
under Chapter 11 to challenge the foreign investment provisions of
NAFTA.243 Still in its infancy stage, the NAFTA arbitration
process is susceptible to criticism and risks losing all legitimacy.
For the arbitration process, survival means balancing the interests
of fairness and equity within a limited dispute resolution remedy
against the interests of the three North American participants in
maintaining sovereignty.
Although critics were concerned that the Mondev Tribunal
would usurp national sovereignty by providing expropriation
provisions inconsistent with domestic law, acting as international
court of appeals for domestic court decisions, and overturning the
longstanding rule of sovereign immunity, the real effects of
Mondev are much less intrusive. Instead, the real effect of Mondev
was to clarify relatively minor provisions of NAFTA. On the one
hand, the Tribunal relaxed the procedural requirements for
bringing a claim under Articles 1116 and 1117. On the other hand,
the Tribunal applied a more restrictive "customary international
law" test to Article 1105(1) claims that helps to prevent abuse of
the NAFTA process. In the end, the Tribunal helped recommit the
arbitration process to the correct balance between investor
protection and national sovereignty.
CHAD D. HANSEN
241 Id. para. 103.
242 See NAFTA, supra note 13, art. 1123, at 644; see also supra note 8 and
accompanying text.
243 See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
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